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Abstract		
Purpose:	This	study	investigates	factors	that	are	associated	with	the	likelihood	of	New	Zealand	listed	
companies	disclosing	non-GAAP	earnings	performance	measures.		
Design/methodology/approach:	 The	 study	 uses	 logistic	 regression	 analysis	 of	 516	 firm	 year	
observations	of	New	Zealand	companies	for	the	period	2009	to	2014.	
Findings:	The	research	evidence	suggests	that	New	Zealand	listed	companies	that	are	most	likely	to	
disclose	non-GAAP	earnings	are	larger,	have	higher	analyst	following	and	have	a	higher	proportion	of	
independent	directors	compared	with	other	companies.	 	 In	addition,	 firms	with	higher	 incidence	of	
restructuring	charges	are	more	likely	to	disclose	non-GAAP	earnings.		
Research	 limitations/implications:	The	study	uses	the	population	of	New	Zealand	 listed	companies	
which	is	small	by	international	standards.		However,	the	financial	reporting	practices	of	New	Zealand	
companies	is	important	to	for	the	efficient	and	effective	operation	of	the	sharemarket	for	investors.		
The	 results	 suggest	 that	New	Zealand	 listed	 companies	 that	 are	under	 greater	 scrutiny	because	of	
their	 size	and	analyst	 following	are	motivated	 to	provide	additional	disclosures	of	non-GAAP	profit	
information	to	the	market.			
Originality/value:	 The	 study	 contributes	 to	 the	 literature	on	 the	 voluntary	disclosure	of	 non-GAAP	
earnings	in	the	New	Zealand	capital	market.			
Keywords:	non-GAAP	earnings,	informativeness	of	earnings,	strategic	earning	benchmarks	
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Introduction		
Adjustments	to	statutory	earnings	(non-GAAP	(generally	accepted	accounting	principles)	
earnings)	are	a	common	occurrence	in	the	financial	reporting	environment	in	a	number	of	countries.		
This	trend	has	been	well	documented	and	researched	in	the	United	States	both	before	
(Bhattacharya	et.	al.,	2003;	Bhattacharya	et.	al.,	2004)	and	after	regulations	to	improve	reporting	
practice	(Black	et.	al.,	2015).		
This	study	investigates	factors	that	are	associated	with	the	likelihood	of	New	Zealand	listed	
companies	disclosing	non-GAAP	earnings	performance	measures.		The	study	considers	
characteristics	of	earnings	that	may	be	more	likely	associated	with	companies	disclosing	non-GAAP	
earnings.		The	study	also	investigates	the	effect	of	company	ownership	and	governance	
characteristics	on	the	likelihood	of	companies	disclosing	non-GAAP	earnings.		
Market	regulators	raise	concerns	about	the	use	of	non-GAAP	earnings	(International	
Organisation	of	Securities	Commissions,	2014,	European	Securities	and	Markets	Authority).		
Managers	have	the	flexibility	to	adjust	audited	earnings	which	may	vary	from	period	to	period	and	
company	to	company.		Managers	also	are	free	to	decide	how	to	communicate	non-GAAP	earnings	
through	the	media.		These	potential	weaknesses	can	reduce	the	usefulness	of	the	non-GAAP	
earnings	measures	and	potentially	mislead	investors.			
The	common	practice	of	reporting	non-GAAP	earnings	measures	raises	doubts	about	the	
credibility	of	generally	accepted	accounting	practice	report	financial	performance	that	meets	the	
needs	of	a	range	of	users.		In	particular,	the	focus	of	GAAP	reporting	on	the	balance	sheet	and	
subsequent	adjustments	to	avoid	overstating	assets	has	been	criticised	as	impacting	the	usefulness	
of	earnings	for	measuring	and	predicting	performance	(Ohlson	2006;	Dichev	and	Tang	2008).			
The	New	Zealand	Financial	Markets	Authority	(FMA)	introduced	non-GAAP	earnings	
disclosure	guidelines	from	1	January	2013	to	reduce	the	potential	for	non-GAAP	information	to	be	
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misleading	(FMA,	2012).		Non-GAAP	earnings	measures	are	permitted	but	they	are	to	be	unbiased,	
calculated	consistently	from	period	to	period	and	reconciled	to	audited	GAAP	earnings	(FMA,	2012).		
The	sample	consists	of	516	firm	year	observations	of	New	Zealand	listed	companies	for	the	
period	2009	to	2014.		A	logit	regression	is	used	to	examine	the	determinants	of	companies	disclosing	
non-GAAP	earnings.		The	results	show	that	companies	under	scrutiny	by	the	market	because	of	their	
size	and	greater	number	of	analysts	following	are	more	likely	to	disclose	adjusted	earnings.		The	
results	also	show	that	companies	with	more	independent	boards	are	also	more	likely	to	report	non-
GAAP	earnings	consistent	with	prior	research	on	voluntary	disclosure	and	incentives	for	independent	
directors	protect	their	reputations	and	mitigate	director	liability	(Lim,	et.	al.,	2007).		Thre	is	a	positive	
association	with	the	number	of	restructuring	and	the	disclosure	of	non-GAAP	earnings	indicting	eha	
mabngers	wish	to	exclude	the	effect	fo	restrvurign	on	operatiosn	een	thogut	suchn	items	can	be	
sperately	diclsed	under	inerantionalfinancial	standtads	(NZ	IAS	1	impact	on	.			
This	study	contributes	to	developing	research	of	non-GAAP	earnings	in	different	countries.		
Research	on	non-GAAP	earning	has	been	predominantly	conducted	in	the	United	States,	however,	
institutional	and	market	features	may	differ	from	country	to	country	which	may	change	managers’	
incentives	to	report	non-GAAP	earnings.		Thus	it	is	appropriate	to	examine	factors	influencing	the	
reporting	of	non-GAAP	earning	measures	in	New	Zealand.		New	Zealand	is	a	small	country	with	an	
open	economy	with	stable	political	and	legal	frameworks	operating	on	free	market	principles	with	
export	trade	being	of	fundamental	importance	to	the	country’s	long	term	growth.		The	effective	
functioning	of	the	capital	market	is	an	important	component	to	achieve	long	term	growth.		Although	
New	Zealand’s	sharemarket	is	small	by	international	standards	it	has	been	experiencing	growth	and	
improved	turnover	in	recent	years	(Rosborough,	et	al.,	2015).			
The	study	also	contributes	to	New	Zealand	policy	making	in	financial	markets	by	providing	a	
greater	understanding	of	voluntary	financial	reporting	disclosures.			
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The	paper	begins	by	providing	background	to	non-GAAP	earnings	disclosures	followed	by	
hypotheses	identifying	factors	likely	to	influence	firms	to	adjust	non-GAAP	earnings.		The	research	
model	is	defined	and	the	sample	selection	described.		The	data	is	analysed	and	commentary	on	the	
hypotheses	is	made.		
Background	and	Hypotheses		
The	disclosure	of	(non-GAAP	earnings	is	a	common	feature	of	the	financial	reporting	
environment	both	in	New	Zealand	and	overseas	(Black	et.	al.,	2015,	Deloitte	2014).		
Non-GAAP	earnings	are	defined	by	the	New	Zealand	FMA	(2012)	as	a	measure	of	profit	not	
defined	in	NZ	International	Accounting	Standard	1.		Common	terms	used	for	these	measures	are	
“underlying	profit”,	“normalised	earnings”,	and	“earnings	before	interest	and	taxation”	amongst	
others.		
It	the	accounting	literature	it	is	common	for	agency	theory	to	be	used	to	explain	the	voluntary	
disclosure	of	financial	information	(Cotter,	et.al.,	2011).		Listed	companies	have	diffuse	ownership	
which	creates	agency	relationships	between	the	managers	(the	agent)	and	the	shareholders	
(principal)	(Jensen	and	Meckling,	1976).		The	shareholders	delegate	the	strategic	and	operation	
decisions	of	the	company	to	the	managers.	The	transfer	of	decision	control	results	in	the	agency	
problem	as	managers	may	act	to	maximise	their	own	wealth	rather	than	that	of	the	shareholders.		
The	separation	of	ownership	and	management	results	in	information	asymmetry	where	the	
managers	know	more	about	what	is	going	on	in	the	firm	and	its	potential	future	value.		To	ensure	
that	mangers	act	in	the	interests	of	the	company	monitoring	and	bonding	costs	are	incurred.	
Monitoring	costs	include	the	appointment	of	independent	directors	and	the	production	of	audited	
financial	statements	and	other	disclosures.		A	primary	incentive	for	voluntary	disclosures	by	mangers	
is	to	reduce	information	asymmetries	and	the	problem	of	adverse	selection.	
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In	the	context	of	non-GAAP	earnings,	managers	may	be	motivated	to	disclose	non-GAAP	
earnings	to	provide	additional	information	to	the	market	about	earnings.		Research	evidence	
indicates	that	non-GAAP	earnings	as	compared	with	GAAP	earnings	are	more	persistent,	value	
relevant	and	give	a	better	picture	of	permanent	earnings	(Bhattacharya	et	al.,2	003;.	Brown	and	
Sivakumar,	2003;	Entwistle	et	al.,	2010).		However	there	is	also	evince	that	indicates	that	managers	
use	non-GAAP	earnings	opportunistically	to	change	investors’	perceptions.		Evidence	of	
opportunistic	behaviour	has	been	identified	in	research	studies	(Bhattacharya	et	al.,	2004;	Doyle	et	
al.,	2011).	
In	summary	the	voluntarily	disclosure	of	non-GAAP	earnings	reduce	information	asymmetries	
between	internal	management	of	companies	and	parties	external	to	the	firm.		Based	on	agency	
theory	factors	that	may	influence	companies	to	voluntarily	disclose	non-GAAP	earnings	are	
examined.		
Hypothesis	Development		
Earnings	characteristics	
Earnings	are	a	 key	metric	 for	external	 stakeholders	 and	managers	may	disclose	non-GAAP	
earnings	to	provide	more	 information	to	the	market.	 	Predictability	of	earnings	 is	a	major	concern	
for	 company	 financial	 executives	 and	 strategies	 are	 used	 to	 smooth	 earnings	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	
negative	market	 reactions	 to	 changes	 in	 earnings	 (Graham	 et.al,	 2005).	 	 Firms	may	 exclude	 non-
recurring	 items	 from	GAAP	earnings	 to	 report	 “core	earnings”	 for	 improving	predicting	 cash	 flows	
and	 valuing	 firms	 (Black	 and	 Christensen,	 2009).	 	 Bhattacharya,	 et.al.	 (2003)	 find	 that	 non-GAAP	
earnings	 are	more	 informative	 and	 persistent	 than	 GAAP	 earnings	 if	 adjustments	 to	 earnings	 are	
one-off	 and	 non-recurring	 such	 as	 gains	 and	 losses	 on	 selling	 assets,	 extraordinary	 items	 and	
discontinued	operations.	 	 In	an	 international	 financial	 reporting	 standards	environment,	Rainsbury	
et.	al.	(2015)	find	that	non-GAAP	earnings	are	more	powerful	in	predicting	future	earnings	compared	
with	 audited	 net	 profit	 after	 tax	 while	 Malone	 et	 al.,	 (2015)	 find	 that	 companies	 with	 a	 higher	
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number	 remeasurement	adjustments	 	and	non-recurring	 items	are	associated	with	disclosing	non-
GAAP	earnings.			
Earnings	of	firms	in	the	United	States	have	become	more	volatile	and	less	persistent	(Dichev	
and	Tang	2008).		Dichev	(2008)	argues	that	these	earnings	attributes	have	deteriorated	because	the	
financial	 reporting	 framework	emphasises	the	balance	sheet	and	that	 if	current	earnings	are	not	a	
good	predictor	of	future	earnings	then	managers	will	use	non-GAAP	earnings	to	inform	the	market	
and	reduce	information	risk.		Non-GAAP	earnings	disclosures	are	found	to	be	associated	with	firms	
that	 have	 less	 persistent	 earnings	 that	 include	 loss	 making	 firms	 (Bhattacharya	 et.	 al.,	 2003;	
Bhattacharya	et.	al.,	2004;	Lougee	and	Marquardt,	2004,	Frankel	et.	al.,	2013)	and	 firms	with	high	
earnings	volatility	(Frankel	et.	al.,	2013).	
Senior	financial	executives	consider	that	it	 is	 important	to	meet	earnings	targets	to	build	the	
reputations	of	 the	 company	and	management	 in	 the	 capital	market	 and	 to	maintain	 and	 increase	
share	prices.	 	Failure	to	meet	benchmarks	creates	uncertainty	for	stakeholders	about	the	future	of	
the	company	and	speculation	about	underlying	problems	in	the	company.		In	the	United	States	the	
most	 important	 benchmarks	 to	 meet	 are	 quarterly	 earnings	 for	 the	 prior	 period	 and	 analysts’	
consensus	of	earnings	(Graham	et.	al.,	2005).		Research	evidence	suggests	that	companies	are	more	
likely	 to	 disclose	 non-GAAP	 earnings	 to	 avoid	 an	 earnings	 decline	 (Bhattacharya	 et.	 al.,	 2004)	 or	
when	they	enhance	core	earnings.	(Curtis	et.	al.,	2014).		Some	studies	also	show	that	adjustments	to	
earnings	can	be	opportunistic	(Black	and	Christensen,	2009;	Doyle	et.	al.,	2011,	Barth	et.	al.,	2012).	
This	leads	to	the	first	hypothesis:		
	
H1	Companies	with	(a)	a	high	incidence	of	remeasurement	and	non-recurring	items	(b)	losses,	(c)	
high	earnings	volatility,	(d)	a	decline	in	GAAP	earnings	from	the	prior	year,	are	more	likely	to	disclose	
non-GAAP	earnings.	
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Substantial	share	ownership			
As	outlined	previously	information	asymmetry	occurs	between	managers	and	providers	of	
capital	as	managers	will	have	more	information	about	the	performance	of	a	company	compared	
with	shareholders.		When	ownership	is	more	widely	spread	owners	have	less	power	to	demand	the	
information	they	require.		However,	shareholders	that	have	substantial	ownership	will	have	the	
power	to	access	the	information	they	require	reducing	the	need	for	voluntary	disclosures	by	
managers.		This	suggests	a	negative	association	between	the	disclosure	of	non-GAAP	earnings	and	
substantial	shareholding.			
The	second	hypothesis	is:	
	
H2	Companies	with	a	high	proportion	of	substantial	shareholders	are	less	likely	to	disclose	non-GAAP	
earnings.		
Analysts	
Analysts	are	sophisticated	users	of	financial	information	and	monitor	the	performance	of	
companies.		Research	shows	a	positive	association	between	companies	disclosing	information	
voluntarily	and	the	number	of	analysts	following	the	firm	because	voluntary	disclosures	reduce	the	
costs	for	analysts	of	acquiring	information	and	increases	the	supply	of	private	information	(Lang	and	
Lundholm,	1993).			
Consistent	with	this	argument,	non-GAAP	earnings	disclosures	in	press	releases	are	
positively	associated	with	the	number	of	analysts	following	a	firm	(Bowen	et.	al	2005;	Isidro	&	
Marques,	2013).		In	Australia,	companies	disclosing	non-GAAP	earnings	are	larger	and	have	higher	
analyst	following	compared	to	other	listed	companies	(Malone	et.	al,	2015).	
The	third	hypothesis	is:		
Liz Rainsbury  11/15/2015 6:06 PM
Comment	[1]:	Need	some	prior	research	and	
ownership	
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H3	Companies	with	higher	analyst	following	are	more	likely	to	disclose	non-GAAP	earnings.		
Board	of	Directors	
Independent	directors	are	recommended	as	part	of	good	corporate	governance	(FMA,	2014).	
Information	asymmetries	exist	between	managers	and	shareholder.	Independent	directors	have	
incentives	to	seek	and	disclose	voluntary	information	and	enhance	their	reputations	and	reduce	
their	exposure	to	litigation	risk	from	being	a	director.			
Research	studies	find	that	more	independent	boards	of	directors	are	associated	with	higher	
quality	of	financial	reporting.		Cheng	and	Courtenay	(2006)	find	a	positive	association	between	board	
independence	and	voluntary	disclosure	suggesting	that	a	more	independent	board	will	disclose	
information	to	the	market.	Lim	et.	al.,	(2007)	also	find	independent	boards	provide	voluntary	
disclosures	that	are	forward	looking	and	strategic	but	board	composition	has	no	impact	on	voluntary	
disclosures	of	a	financial	nature.			
Research	findings	also	show	that	more	independent	boards	play	a	role	in	monitoring	the	
quality	of	non-GAAP	earnings.		Items	excluded	from	non-GAAP	earnings	by	firms	with	more	(less)	
independent	boards	are	generally	less	(more)	persistent	and	not	associated	(associated)	with	future	
returns	(Frankel	et.	al.,	2010,	Jennings	and	Marques	2011).		In	addition,	Entwhistle	et.	al.	(2012)	find	
that	non-GAAP	earnings	exclusions	are	more	informative	for	firms	with	stronger	corporate	
governance,	auditor	quality	and	a	history	of	higher	reporting	quality.			
The	fourth	hypothesis	is:		
	
H4	Companies	with	a	higher	proportion	of	independent	directors	are	more	likely	to	disclose	non-
GAAP	earnings.	
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Leverage	
Agency	conflicts	can	arise	between	shareholders	and	creditors	with	increases	in	debt	(Jensen	
and	Meckling,	1976).		Managers	under	greater	scrutiny	of	creditors	may	voluntarily	disclose	
information	to	reduce	agency	costs.		Alternatively	the	existence	of	debt	covenants	and	close	
business	relationships	with	relationships	with	bankers	may	reduce	the	need	for	voluntary	
disclosures.		Given	that	the	relation	between	leverage	and	voluntarily	disclosures	is	unclear	
Hypothesis	5	is	stated	in	the	null	form.		
H5	Firms	with	higher	levels	of	debt	are	not	associated	with	disclosure	of	non-GAAP	earnings.	
Research	Model			
A	logistic	regression	model	is	used	to	test	the	hypotheses.		The	dependent	variable	is	an	
indicator	variable	of	1	if	a	listed	company	discloses	non-GAAP	earnings.			The	explanatory	variables	
are	determinants	of	non-GAAP	earning	disclosures.		The	model	is:	
Log	(p/(1-p)	=	β0	+	β1Loss	+	β2VarEarn	+	β3Rem	+	β4NonRecurr	+	β5DecEarn	+	β6SubSh	+	
β7Analyst	+	β8Bind	+β9Lev	+	β10Auditor	+	β11Size	+	β12Guide	+	β13Ind		
Five	variables	measure	characteristics	of	earnings	that	may	motivate	firms	to	disclose	non-
GAAP	earnings.		The	variables	are	defined	as	follows:		(1)	Loss	is	an	indicator	variable	of	1	if	GAAP	
earnings	are	negative,	(2)	VarEarn	is	the	variability	of	earnings	and	is	measured	by	the	standard	
deviation	of	the	return	on	assets	(Frankel	et.	al.,	2011)	for	the	last	four	years.		(3)	Firms	with	
remeasurements	are	split	into	two	types	of	adjustments.	The	first	are	the	number	of	accounting	
remeasurement	adjustments	(Rem)	for	revaluation	of	property	(including	investment	property),	
plant	and	equipment	investment	property,		impairment	expenses	and	changes	in	the	fair	value	of	
financial	instruments.	The	second	type	of	adjustments	are	often	referred	to	by	companies	as	
nonrecurring	items	(Nonrecurr)	and	include	the	number	of	restructuring	charges	and	one	–off	
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charges	such	as	gains	and	losses	on	disposal	of	businesses.		(5)	DecEarn	is	an	indicator	variable	of	1	if	
there	is	a	decrease	in	GAAP	earnings	from	the	prior	year	or	zero	otherwise.			
The	next	set	of	variables	consider	firm	characteristics.	Substantial	shareholders	(SubSh)	is	
the	percentage	of	shares	held	by	substantial	shareholders.	A	substantial	shareholder	is	defined	as	a	
person	that	has	a	5%	shareholding	of	a	listed	issuer	(Financial	Markets	Conduct	2013,	section	274).	
Analyst	is	the	number	of	analysts	following	a	listed	company.		Board	independent	(Bind	is	the	
percentage	of	board	members	who	are	independent	as	disclosed	in	company	corporate	governance	
statements.		Leverage	(Lev)	is	the	total	liabilities	as	a	proportion	of	total	assets.		
Control	variables	are	included	for	the	quality	of	auditor	(Auditor)	which	is	an	indicator	
variable	of	1	if	a	company	is	audited	by	a	Big	4	audit	firm,	zero	otherwise.		Dummier	variables	are	
included	for	the	type	of	industry	(Ind)	as	disclosures	levels	may	vary	depending	upon	the	nature	and	
competitiveness	of	the	industry	,	firm	size	(Size)	–	information	asymmetry	problems	(Jensen	and	
Meckling,	1976)	and	political	costs	may	increase	as	firms	grow.		The	last	variable	is	Guide	to	control	
for	the	introduction	of	disclosure	guidelines	from	the	Financial	Markets	Authority	in	2013.			
Population	and	Sample	
The	population	is	observations	of	earning	and	firm	characteristics	of	companies	listed	on	the	
NZX	from	2009-2014.		Excluded	from	this	are	unit	trusts	and	overseas	companies.	Companies	that	
listed	during	the	period	each	year	or	had	missing	data	are	excluded.		A	summary	of	the	sample	is	
shown	in	Table	1.		
Results		
Descriptive	Statistics	
Table	2	summarises	the	descriptive	statistics.	Losses	are	incurred	by	an	average	of	28%	of	the	
firm	observations	and	the	average	standard	deviation	of	earnings	is	16.21.		Remeasurements	of	
assets	are	recorded	by	dollar	amount	and	number.		Revaluations	average	-2.164	million	due	to	
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revaluations	upwards	and	downwards	on	property	(including	investment	property),	plant	and	
equipment.		The	maximum	and	minimum	results	along	with	the	standard	deviation	show	
considerable	variation	in	the	adjustments	for	revaluations	of	property	plant	and	equipment,	fair	
value	changes	in	financial	instrument	and	restructuring	charges.		The	average	number	of	
remeasurements	per	company	is	0.78.		
Restructuring	charges	average	1.5	million	and	the	average	number	of	adjustments	per	
company	of	0.27.	Overall	restructuring	charges	and	other	times	average	0.72	per	company.		
Earning	decreases	occur	for	45%	of	the	firm	observations.		Substantial	shareholders	hold	an	
average	of	45%	shareholding.			Board	independence	averages	62%.		Average	gearing	of	the	firms	is	
49%	and	Big	4	auditors	dominate	the	audit	market	auditing	85%	of	the	sample.			
Table	3	reports	the	descriptive	statistics	for	the	variables	distinguishing	between	companies	
disclosing	non-GAAP	earnings	and	those	that	are	not.		The	non-GAAP	earnings	disclosure	group	
report	less	losses,	earnings	are	less	volatile	compared	with	the	other	reporting	companies.		The	non-
GAAP	earnings	disclosure	group	are	more	likely	to	have	a	greater	incidence	of	revaluations,	financial	
instrument	fair	value	adjustments,	restructuring	and	other	charges.		The	non-GAAP	earnings	
disclosure	group	are	larger,	have	a	lower	proportion	of	substantial	shareholders,	higher	board	
independence	and	audited	by	a	non-Big	4	auditor.		
Table	4	presents	the	results	of	the	regression.		The	Nagelkerke	R2	is	high	indicating	that	the	
model	accounts	for	52%	of	the	variability	of	the	dependent	variable,	with	the	model	predicting	the	
dependent	variable	85%	of	time.			
In	relation	to	earning	characteristics,	the	model	shows	that	that	there	is	no	significant	
association	between	companies	incurring	losses,	decreases	in	earnings,	higher	volatility	of	earnings,	
the	number	of	remeasurements	items	and	the	likelihood	of	disclosing	non-GAAP	earnings.		However,	
companies	with	restructuring	charges	are	weakly	positively	associated	with	disclosure	of	non-GAAP	
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earnings	measures.		Controlling	for	other	variables,	a	one	unit	increase	in	restructuring	count	
increases	the	odds	of	a	company	disclosing	non-GAAP	earnings	increases	by	57.7%	(1.5	times	higher	
odds	to	disclose	non-GAAP	earnings).		Thus	hypothesis	is	1	is	only	weakly	supported	for	non-
recurring	items.		The	analysis	is	repeated	for	the	dollar	amounts	for	remeasurements	and	non-
recurring	adjustments	for	the	dollar	amounts	but	the	coefficients	are	not	significant.	This	result	may	
be	due	to	the	offsetting	effect	of	debit	and	credit	adjustments.		
The	results	show	that	analyst	following	is	significantly	positively	associated	with	non-GAAP	
earnings	disclosures	thus	supporting	Hypothesis	3.		Controlling	for	other	variables,	a	one	unit	
increase	in	analyst	following	will	increase	the	odds	of	a	company	disclosing	non-GAAP	earnings	2.15	
times.			
Hypothesis	4	is	supported	with	firms	with	a	higher	proportion	of	independent	directors	more	
likely	to	disclose	non-GAAP	earnings.		
The	spread	of	ownership	of	the	firms	and	leverage	have	no	significant	impact	on	non-GAAP	
earnings	disclosures.	Thus	H2	and	H5	are	not	supported.		
The	control	variables	are	not	significant	except	for	firm	size.		
Summary	and	Conclusion	
New	Zealand	listed	companies	frequently	report	non-GAAP	earnings	measures	which	adjusted	
from	profit	reported	under	generally	accepted	accounting	practice.		This	research	paper	investigates	
factors	associated	with	the	voluntary	disclosure	of	non-GAAP	earnings	by	New	Zealand	listed	
companies.		
New	Zealand	listed	companies	that	are	most	likely	to	disclose	non-GAAP	earnings	are	larger,	
have	higher	analyst	following	and	have	a	higher	proportion	of	independent	directors	compared	with	
other	companies.		In	addition,	firms	with	higher	incidence	of	restructuring	charges	are	more	likely	to	
disclose	non-GAAP	earnings.		
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The	results	suggest	that	New	Zealand	listed	companies	that	are	under	greater	scrutiny	
because	of	their	size	and	analyst	following	are	motivated	to	provide	additional	disclosures	of	non-
GAAP	profit	information	to	the	market.		The	results	also	suggest	that	the	more	independent	boards	
are	associated	with	voluntary	disclosures	which	may	suggest	a	desire	for	improve	their	reputations	
and	mitigate	the	risks	of	a	listed	company	director.		
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Variable	Definitions	
Non-GAAP	earnings	 	 An	indicator	variable	that	a	listed	company	disclosed	non-GAAP	
earnings,	Yes=1,	0	otherwise		
Loss	 +	 An	indicator	variable	of	1	if	GAAP	earnings	in	current	year	are	negative,	0	
otherwise	
Volatility	of	
earnings		
+	 Standard	deviation	of	the	return	on	assets	for	the	last	four	years	
Remeasurement	Items	
Revaluation		 +	 The	number	of	items	in	current	year	for	revaluation	of	investment	
property,	property	plant	and	equipment	
Impairment	 +	 The	number	of	items	in	current	year	for	impairment	expense	
Financial	
Instruments	
+	 The	number	of	items	in	current	year	for	changes	in	fair	value	of	financial	
instruments	
Restructuring	and	Other	Items	
Restructuring		 +	 The	number	of	items	in	the	current	year	for	restructuring	items		
Other	items		 +	 The	number	of	items	in	the	current	year	for	one-off	charges	such	as	gain	
or	loss	on	sale	of	business	
Dec	Earn	 +	 An	indicator	variable	where	GAAP	earnings	in	the	current	year	is	less	
than	the	previous	year,	0	otherwise	
SubSh	 –	 Percentage	of	shares	held	by	substantial	shareholders	
Analyst	 +	 Number	of	analysts	following	a	listed	company	
Bind	 +	 Percentage	of	board	members	who	are	independent	
Leverage		 +	 Total	assets/total	liabilities	
Auditor	 	 An	indicator	variable	of	1	if	the	company	auditor	is	a	Big	4	audit	firm,	0	
otherwise	
Lev	 –	 Leverage,	total	assets/total	liabilities	
Size	 	 Log	of	total	assets	
Guide	 ?	 An	indicator	variable	for	FMA	Guidelines	applicable	for	years	2013-14	
years,	0	otherwise	
Industry		 ?	 	
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Table	1		
Sample	Summary		
 
	 n	
NZSX	listed	companies	2009-2014		 912	
Less	unit	trust	companies	 -114	
Less	overseas	companies		 -54	
Less	companies	listed	in	2010-2014	 -186	
Less	companies	with	missing	data	 -42	
Total	Sample	 516	
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Table	2	
Sample	Descriptive	Statistics	(2009-2014)	(n=516)	
	 Variable	 Mean	 Std	Dev	 Min	 Max	
Loss	 Loss	 0.28	 0.45	 0	 1	
Variability	of	earnings		 Var	Earn	 16.21	 87.03	 0.05	 1,793	
Remeasurements		 	 	 	 	 	
Dollars	($’000)	 	 	 	 	 	
Revaluations		 	 -2,164	 27,701	 -248,301	 174,019	
Financial	Instruments		 	 401	 18,383	 -118,000	 366,000	
Impairments		 	 -58	 1,277	 -28,988	 152	
Total	 	 -1,822	 32,262	 -269,170	 285,000	
Number		 	 	 	 	 	
Revaluations	 	 0.41	 0.64	 0	 4	
Financial	instruments		 	 0.36	 0.58	 0	 3	
Impairments	 	 0.01	 1.00	 0	 1	
Total		 	 0.78	 0.95	 0	 6	
Non-Recurring	and	Other	Items	 	 	 	 	 	
Dollars	($’000)	 	 	 	 	 	
Restructuring	 	 1,525	 34,839	 -105,000	 705,000	
Other		 	 1,309	 24,087	 -321,143	 357,612	
Total		 	 3,107	 46,466	 -322,727	 846,000	
Number	 	 	 	 	 	
Restructuring	 	 0.27	 0.53	 0	 3	
Other		 	 0.45	 0.73	 0	 4	
Total		 	 0.72	 0.96	 0	 6	
Earnings	decrease		 DecEarn		 0.45	 0.50	 0	 1	
Substantial	shareholder	(%)	 SubSh	 44.91	 25.21	 0	 95.64	
Analyst	following	 Analyst	 1.03	 0.94	 0	 3	
Board	independence	(%)	 Bind	 61.69	 19.90	 0	 100	
Leverage	 	 0.49	 0.52	 0	 6.60	
Auditor	 	 0.85	 0.35	 0	 1	
Total	Assets	($’000)	 Size	 857,050	 1,498,702	 79	 7,492,000	
Net	profit	after	tax	($’000)	 	 29,576	 71,919	 -306,505	 460,000	
Refer	to	variable	definitions	
